An IRGC adviser says prolonging the US-Iran war could be one way for Tehran to build deterrence and wait out the Trump presidency.
Iran may be prepared for a long war with the United States, according to a senior adviser to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander.
The comments came from Mohammad Reza Naqdi, a senior adviser to the commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), during a rare interview with PBS NewsHour. Naqdi said deliberately prolonging the conflict until the end of US President Donald Trump's presidency was one option Iran could consider. He described the strategy as a way of imposing “attrition” on the United States and creating enough deterrence to make future attacks against Iran more costly.
The Editorial Team of Behind The Headlines reports that the remarks are significant because they suggest that at least one senior figure in Iran's military establishment is thinking beyond a short-term battlefield outcome. Instead of treating the conflict as a war that must be won quickly, Tehran could seek to survive the pressure, continue inflicting costs, replenish its military capabilities and wait for political circumstances in Washington to change. However, Naqdi's comments should not be interpreted as a formal Iranian decision to fight until Trump leaves office. They describe one possible strategy, while the actual course of the war could still be influenced by military developments, negotiations, economic pressure and political decisions on both sides.
What exactly did the IRGC adviser say?
The remarks were made during an interview with PBS NewsHour in Tehran.
Naqdi was asked whether Iran's objective could be to keep the conflict going until Trump leaves office.
His response was that prolonging the war was one possible way of achieving deterrence.
The logic is relatively simple.
If Iran can make a military conflict sufficiently expensive and difficult for the United States, Tehran hopes Washington—and any future government considering military action—will think twice before launching another attack.
Naqdi also spoke about attrition, meaning a strategy in which a country attempts to exhaust its opponent over time rather than defeat it through one decisive military operation.
That makes the statement less about a specific battlefield objective and more about Iran's calculation of time, political pressure and endurance.
Why would Iran want to wait for Trump?
The answer is political as much as military.
A US president has a limited term in office. Military conflicts, however, can continue for much longer.
If Tehran believes that US policy towards Iran could change after Trump leaves office, it could view simply surviving the current confrontation as a strategic objective.
The idea would be to avoid making concessions under immediate military pressure and instead wait for a possible change in Washington.
That does not mean Iran expects a future US president to automatically adopt a softer policy.
Rather, Tehran may believe that a change in leadership creates an opportunity for a different diplomatic calculation.
This is why Naqdi's reference to Trump's departure is important.
Iran appears to be signalling that it does not necessarily believe Washington can force a quick political settlement through military pressure alone.
What does Iran mean by 'attrition'?
Attrition warfare is about making the opponent continuously spend resources.
Those resources can include:
Weapons and ammunition
Military personnel
Aircraft and naval assets
Money
Intelligence resources
Political capital
Diplomatic support
For the United States, a prolonged conflict could mean maintaining expensive military deployments across the Middle East while dealing with pressure over casualties, spending and wider regional instability.
Iran would also pay a heavy price.
Its economy could face further disruption, infrastructure could be damaged and its military capabilities could come under sustained attack.
The difference is that Tehran may believe it has greater incentive to tolerate those costs because it sees the conflict as an existential struggle.
Is Iran actually running out of missiles?
That is one of the most important questions raised by the interview.
Naqdi claimed that Iran is currently producing more missiles than it is using and suggested that production is taking place at multiple locations.
He also indicated that Iran believes it can continue fighting even if the conflict lasts for years.
However, these are claims from an Iranian military official and have not been independently verified.
The actual size of Iran's remaining missile stockpile, its production capacity and the extent of damage to its missile infrastructure are difficult to establish from publicly available information.
This distinction matters.
Iran wants its adversaries to believe that its missile capability remains sustainable.
The United States and its allies, meanwhile, have an incentive to assess how much of that capability has actually survived the conflict.
What if Iran runs out of missiles?
Naqdi made another striking argument when discussing that possibility.
He suggested that even if Iran's missile supplies were eventually exhausted, Tehran would still have ways to impose costs on the United States.
He pointed to American economic interests around the world and warned that Iran could potentially target such interests.
He did not provide a specific operational plan or identify particular targets.
The statement should therefore be understood primarily as a deterrence warning, rather than evidence that Iran has decided to attack American businesses or facilities worldwide.
The broader message is that Tehran wants Washington to understand that destroying missile stockpiles would not necessarily end Iran's ability to retaliate.
Why are missiles so important to Iran's strategy?
Missiles provide Iran with a way to strike targets at significant distances without having to deploy conventional ground forces deep into enemy territory.
They are therefore central to Tehran's strategy of imposing costs while keeping its own conventional forces relatively protected.
If Iran can maintain missile production, it can potentially continue launching attacks over a longer period.
If production is disrupted or stocks become depleted, Tehran would have to rely more heavily on other forms of military and asymmetric pressure.
That is why the question of Iran's missile inventory is central to any discussion about whether it can actually sustain a long war.
Does this mean the war will continue until 2029?
No.
This is perhaps the most important point to understand.
Naqdi said prolonging the war until the end of Trump's presidency was one possible option. He did not announce that Iran had formally decided to continue fighting until January 2029.
Military officials frequently discuss potential strategies without committing their governments to carrying them out.
A ceasefire, diplomatic agreement, change in military conditions or internal political developments could alter Tehran's calculations.
Therefore, the statement should not be read as a prediction that the war will definitely last until Trump leaves office.
It is better understood as a signal of Iran's willingness to consider a long-war strategy.
Why would Tehran publicly reveal such a strategy?
Because the statement itself can serve a strategic purpose.
In warfare, governments do not communicate only with their own citizens.
They also communicate with their adversaries.
By saying that Iran could continue the conflict for years, Naqdi is effectively sending a message to Washington:
Military pressure may not produce a quick surrender.
That could influence US calculations about the cost and duration of continued military operations.
It may also be aimed at Iran's domestic audience, demonstrating that the country's military leadership believes it has options even under intense pressure.
What are the risks for Iran?
A long war is not without enormous risks for Tehran.
Iran would have to maintain weapons production while protecting military infrastructure from further attacks.
It would also have to deal with economic pressure, disruption to trade and energy infrastructure, civilian casualties and possible domestic political pressure.
The longer a conflict continues, the greater the possibility that unforeseen events could trigger escalation.
A prolonged war could also make diplomacy harder.
The more destruction accumulates on both sides, the more politically difficult it can become for either government to make concessions.
What are the risks for the United States?
Washington faces a different but equally difficult calculation.
The United States has vastly greater conventional military capabilities, but sustaining a prolonged conflict requires continuous military deployments and resources.
A long war could also affect global energy markets, shipping routes and the wider Middle East.
There is another problem: military superiority does not automatically produce political victory.
The United States could destroy large parts of Iran's military infrastructure while still struggling to persuade Tehran to accept Washington's preferred political settlement.
That is precisely the type of situation an attrition strategy seeks to exploit.
Where do negotiations stand?
The possibility of a prolonged war becomes more significant because diplomatic efforts have also faced difficulties.
Reuters reported on August 12 that efforts to revive an interim peace arrangement between Washington and Tehran had stalled, with both sides accusing the other of failing to meet commitments. Iran has disputed the continuation of the earlier agreement, while the United States has pressed Tehran over issues including the Strait of Hormuz.
That means military strategy and diplomacy are now closely connected.
If negotiations fail, Iran's ability to sustain military pressure becomes more important.
If a diplomatic opening emerges, however, the incentive to continue fighting until Trump's term ends could diminish.
What happens if the war becomes a long conflict?
A prolonged US-Iran war could have consequences well beyond the battlefield.
For oil markets
Any disruption around the Gulf or Strait of Hormuz could affect global energy supplies and prices.
For shipping
Long-term insecurity could increase insurance and transportation costs for vessels operating in the region.
For the Middle East
Countries allied with either Washington or Tehran could face pressure to provide logistical, military or diplomatic support.
For the United States
The conflict could become a major political issue if American military spending and deployments continue for years.
For Iran
The economic and humanitarian consequences could become increasingly severe.
What is Iran really signalling?
The most important takeaway from Naqdi's remarks is not that Iran has decided to fight until 2029.
It is that Tehran wants to demonstrate that time is not necessarily on the side of the United States.
Iran is signalling that it could pursue a war of endurance: continue producing weapons, absorb pressure, impose costs on its opponents and wait for political circumstances to change.
Whether that strategy is actually sustainable remains uncertain.
Iran's missile production claims need independent verification. Its economic resilience is under pressure. And the longer the conflict continues, the greater the risks for Iranian civilians and infrastructure.
At the same time, Washington faces its own calculation over how much military and political capital it is willing to spend.
The conflict may therefore increasingly become a contest not simply over who has more military power, but over who can withstand the pressure for longer.
And that is why Naqdi's reference to Trump's departure is significant.
It suggests that for Tehran, the calendar itself could become part of the battlefield.